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Highlights 
 Changes in the healthcare sector were introduced as part of a bailout 
agreement 
 These included budget cuts, copayments, clinical guidelines and revision 
of beneficiary criteria 
 Co-payments delivered conflicting results and their framework should be 
reassessed 
 Further reforms are needed, and Cyprus must implement universal health 
coverage 
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SUMMARY 
As part of a bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank (known as the Troika), 
Cyprus had to achieve a fiscal surplus through budget constraints and efficiency 
enhancement. As a result, a number of policy changes were implemented, 
including a reform of the healthcare sector, and major healthcare reforms are 
planned for the upcoming years, mainly via the introduction of a National Health 
System. This paper presents the healthcare sector, provides an overview of 
recent reforms, assesses the recently implemented policies and proposes further 
interventions. Recent reforms targeting the demand and supply side included the 
introduction of clinical guidelines, user charges, introduction of coding for 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) and the revision of public healthcare coverage 
criteria. The latter led to a reduction in the number of people with public 
healthcare coverage in a time of financial crises, when this is needed the most, 
while co-payments must be reassessed to avoid creating barriers to access. 
However, DRGs and clinical guidelines can help improve performance and 
efficiency. The changes so far are yet to mark the end of the healthcare sector as 
we know it. A universal public healthcare system must remain a priority and 
must be introduced swiftly to address important existing coverage gaps.   
 
Background  
Cyprus is yet to introduce a universal health coverage system (UHC), and 
it currently features two fragmented and uncoordinated health sectors: A highly 
regulated public and an unregulated, for-profit private sector [1-2]. The public 
sector is funded by the Ministry of Health, and the legal basis for attaining a 
public beneficiary status is Cypriot or EU citizenship, and satisfying one of 
several socioeconomic or employment status criteria. Public servants are 
entitled to free public healthcare regardless of income, which provides an 
indication of the uneven access to free public healthcare [1-3]. People who do not 
meet these criteria must pay out-of-pocket to finance their health needs at the 
public or private sector. The aforementioned issues mean that out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payments are the primary source of healthcare funding (57%), which 
exceeds public funding (43%) [2-3]. Cyprus’ total health expenditure (THE) as a 
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percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is 7.4%, which is among the lowest 
in Europe [4]. 
The fragmentation of the health sector impeded the introduction of 
supply- and demand-side measures, such as co-payments, integrated clinical 
guidelines, prescribing behaviour monitoring, medical audit and price regulation 
of medical activities in the private sector. Moreover, the conundrum of public 
and private sectors escalated to an inefficient allocation of resources, such as the 
duplication of health infrastructure and lack of some specialties such as general 
practitioners [5].  
A much anticipated, approved by law National Health System (NHS) has 
not been enacted, something that has been attributed to a number of factors 
related to politics and concerns regarding its long-term viability [1]. This long-
standing anticipation led to stagnation of further efficiency improvement 
initiatives such as the introduction of electronic patient records and Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA) program. In particular, low spending on universal 
prevention programs and public health policies constitute major barriers to 
efficiency gains [5].  
A major drawback of the current system is the impaired capacity to 
gather and analyse data. Having access to reliable health indicators is important 
in any macroeconomic environment, but its importance is magnified during 
financial recessions, since crises have significant effects on health[6]. In this 
context, the scope of this paper is to present the recently-implemented changes, 
assess the reforms and propose future interventions which will increase 
efficiency. A paper by Cylus et al [3] provided an excellent approach, analysing 
the implementation of the health insurance scheme. We build on this to discuss 
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the new measures that have been introduced since its publication, due to the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)[7]. A recent study by Petrou and 
Vandoros [8] discussed recent reforms, but focused exclusively on 
pharmaceuticals. This paper follows up on these previous studies [3,8,], while it 
discusses the interaction between health, financial crises and mandatory 
reforms.  
 
Policy Reforms  
In early 2013, the MoU with the Troika came into effect, which mandated 
several reforms in healthcare [7].  
 
One of the first measures in 2013 was the introduction of an annual fee 
for all beneficiaries in order to strengthen the sustainability of the funding 
structure. This was combined with the requirement to update and align the 
prices of the public health sector with actual costs incurred to the system, and to 
revise the criteria for public beneficiary status. Moreover, as a tool to address 
tax-evasion (one of the contributing factors to the financial crisis), the public 
beneficiary status is subject to a person’s social insurance contributions. 
However, this led to the exclusion of several patients’ categories from free public 
health care. Such categories include new entrants in the labour market and 
asylum seekers, since obtaining beneficiary status requires a minimum of three 
years’ consecutive contribution to the social insurance fund. The Troika also 
mandated wage cuts and a freeze in recruitment in order to constrain public 
expenditure, which were at first implemented in 2012, prior to the MoU [9]. 
However, income reduction and unemployment (as a result of the crisis), 
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sparked a gradual shift of patients towards public healthcare services [10], 
which peaked in 2011-2012 for inpatient care, demonstrating a 13.5% increase 
versus the previous year [11-12].  Additional workload and reduced resources 
impaired the functional capacity of the public health care sector [1]. 
Consequently, many patients have to choose between long waiting lists in the 
free public sector [13-14], or paying out-of-pocket for instant access to the 
private sector. Relatively high out-of-pocket payments, in the context of the 
financial crisis, emerged as a barrier to indicated medical care for a 28% of the 
population, second only to Greece[10]. In 2013, there was an increase in the 
number of patients who were reimbursed by the MoH for treatment in the 
private sector by 21.7%, due to excessive waiting times. On an individual basis, 
patients may be referred- and reimbursed by the MoH- to the private sector if 
the public sector cannot provide timely care and/or if the condition does not fall 
within the competencies of public sector. This practice was criticized as being 
financially damaging [15]. A downward trend was noticeable by 2015, indicating 
efficient monitoring [16].  
 
 
Regarding rational and efficient prescribing, the value of clinical 
guidelines in providing summarized guidance to physicians [17] had previously 
been ignored in Cyprus. The presence of an ageing population, which shifts the 
pattern of health delivery from acute care to chronic disease management, 
further augments the importance of integrated, chronic-patient oriented, 
guidelines[9,18]. This resulted in the preparation of 20 clinical guidelines for an 
array of health conditions in 2013. A recent survey on these demonstrated high 
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satisfaction rates among physicians [19]. In addition, clinical algorithms aiming 
to regulate laboratory ordering were elaborated for nine high volume and per-
unit cost laboratory tests.  
Traditionally, governments in Cyprus, lulled in a false sense of fiscal 
security due to above-EU average economic growth, avoided demand-side 
measures. An increase in demand, without corresponding improvement in health 
outcomes is associated with an increase in health expenditure as well as waste, 
and may expose patients to unnecessary and potentially harmful interventions. 
Prior to the crisis, the lack of demand-side measures was prominent in all layers 
of the public health care sector, especially pharmaceuticals, emergency care and 
laboratory test ordering, [7], while inefficient practices were previously not 
changed, due to lack of clinical guidelines and HTA program.  
A co-payment, in the form of a fixed uncapped amount was recently introduced 
in 2013 (three and six euros for family doctors and specialists, respectively). 
Results differed depending on the setting: the co-payment reduced visits to 
primary care physicians, but mental health visits proved inelastic [20-21]. In the 
laboratory sector, a co-payment in the form of 0.5 euros per test - capped at 10 
euros per visit - was introduced, after which, paradoxically, there was an 
increase in the number of tests prescribed per patient in the emergency services 
[22]. As a lack of demand-side measures had led to emergency services overuse 
[3], a 10-euro fixed co-payment fee was introduced for all emergency room 
visits, which led to a significant reduction of (primarily non-emergent) visits 
[23], thus relieving an often unnecessary burden which is expected to facilitate 
faster provision of health care when needed the most. 
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 Despite the reduction in the number of people covered by public 
healthcare, the Troika also prioritised the introduction of the NHS, which will 
reduce the currently high out-of-pocket payments and safeguard access to 
healthcare for the whole population. Towards this direction, the tender for the 
electronic IT system, which is necessary for an NHS to function effectively and 
efficiently(and another Troika request) was awarded in late March 2017, 
showing that there are steps taken in this direction.  
In the hospital sector, Cyprus is also working on the replacement of the 
per-diem reimbursement scheme with DRGs, which can increase hospital 
efficiency [24-25].  This sector merits additional attention as hospital care 
accounts for the largest proportion of total health expenditure in Cyprus [3-4]. In 
line with striking differences between the public and private sectors, the product 
mix composition of these sectors varies significantly:  the private sector features 
a large number of relatively small hospitals (16 hospitals, plus 21 polyclinics and 
39 clinics totalling 1455 beds), in contrast to only nine public hospitals with 
1435 beds. Currently, public hospital management teams follow rather 
administrative tasks and can only marginally influence the centralised resource 
allocation and decision-making process. The MoH announced law amendments 
to promote competition between private and public hospitals in the context of 
the NHS, which provides restructuring and public hospital autonomy, so that 
they can operate as independent entities on a decentralised level. Ultimately, this 
aims to minimise politically motivated resource allocation and interventions, 
which impair their productive efficiency[7-26].  
The cumulative impact of the reforms and the austerity measures led to a 
decline in health expenditure per capita, and as a result, health expenditure per 
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capita ranked among the lowest in Europe in 2014 (2,266 PPP$ per capita) 
demonstrating a 2.5% annual average reduction rate, from 2009 onwards [4].  
[FIGURE 1] 
 
Future Challenges and responses 
There is still great potential to further minimise waste while improving 
quality of and access to healthcare through further dissemination and 
optimisation of clinical guidelines. In this context, all ad hoc clinical guidelines 
committees much be institutionalised on a permanent basis with specific terms 
of reference, including revisions, updates and educational activities, towards 
encouraging rational prescribing [27]. It is also imperative to create a medical 
audit and performance management plan to assess compliance to the clinical 
guidelines. This will increase transparency and reduce information asymmetry in 
decision making, while promoting efficiency in a period of reduced resources, 
thus improving quality of care [28].  From an organisational point of view, the 
government must promote meritocracy in order to overcome chronic inertias[1].  
The hospital sector merits more attention. It has been argued that small 
hospital size, as is the case in the majority of private sector hospitals, might 
impede efficiency enhancement[28], while several authors have contested the 
assumption that private hospitals are more efficient than public ones[29-32]. 
The ambitious conversion of public hospitals into semi-autonomous and self-
financed entities might not necessarily lead to significant efficiency gains, 
especially given the introduction of a DRG remuneration scheme [33]. Therefore, 
it is vital to safeguard access of costlier patients to appropriate care [34], since 
experiences from other countries underline the risk of channeling healthier 
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patients to the private sector and leaving public hospitals to deal with costlier 
and riskier patients [35-36]. It is also worth noting that public hospitals 
currently provide health care for severe cases, which are not always offered in 
the private sector and private hospitals might not be able to bridge this gap 
immediately. 
As Cyprus just exited the MoU, it is expected that temporary wage cuts 
will be reversed. This will increase fiscal pressure on the public sector and most 
importantly on public hospitals which are scheduled to become autonomous 
within five years after the law is enacted. If, however, wage cuts become 
permanent, sustaining staff resilience will be challenging, especially given the 
massive health market restructure and its scheduled unification.  
The introduction of the much-needed and long-anticipated NHS faces 
significant challenges. The consolidation of the heterogenic for-profit private and 
the highly bureaucratic public sectors, may create an administrative barrier. The 
lack of proper planning raises concerns on whether the number of GPs, whose 
number has decreased, is sufficient to comprise a strong primary health care 
sector which will act as a gatekeeper[5]. A multi-payer health system option has 
been put forward. However, the small size of the market and the degree of 
competitive forces requires further investigation regarding the feasibility of such 
a payer type. Moreover, given that the current system has led to uneven access to 
healthcare [1], findings from other countries suggest that this phenomenon 
might be exacerbated [37-39]. As a response, Cyprus should swiftly introduce the 
designed universal coverage single payer health system. 
 
Conclusion  
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There are certain elements of positive contribution towards achieving an 
efficient and sustainable health sector in some of the recently-implemented 
changes. However, challenges remain. Co-payments might have reduced waste in 
some areas, but certain adjustments such as exemptions and caps, based on 
socio-economic criteria or chronic diseases should be introduced, to avoid any 
barriers to access for vulnerable groups, patients with chronic diseases or those 
who face affordability issues. Especially during recessions, user charges may 
cause problems [40-41], so improving efficiency should be done without 
jeopardising access to treatment to those who need it.  
Importantly, the recently revised public healthcare eligibility criteria 
reduced the number of people covered by public health sector, which is in the 
opposite direction of the universal health coverage that Cyprus aims to 
implement. This has removed a safety net for these individuals in a time of 
financial hardship, which is when they need it the most. The public sector’s 
overload and reduced number of staff has limited access further, thus leaving 
these patients with out-of-pocket payments as the only option.  
The government must continue unabated the reforms that will create the 
pillars of a much needed and long overdue NHS, meaning that it is important not 
to abolish the long term strategic planning in favour of any short-term, and 
short-sighted, opportunistic gains. Further changes should focus on performance 
management and medical audit and provide clinical guidance. All 
aforementioned issues require transparency, accountability and meritocracy, 
free from any political interference.   
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The crisis led to reforms that in some cases increased efficiency while in 
others they provided some sort of barriers to care, but more time is needed to 
get a full picture of their effects and consequences. In any case, these changes 
have yet to mark the end of the healthcare sector as we know it. This will only be 
completed once universal coverage under a single payer is finally implemented, 
facilitating access to care for everyone.  
 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Editor of the Health Reform Monitor 
Section of the Journal and three anonymous referees for their useful comments 
and suggestions. All outstanding errors are our own.  
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 
REFERENCES 
1. Petrou P.  Financial Crisis as a reform mediator in Cyprus’ health Services. 
Eurohealth incorating Euroobserver 2014; 20:35-3 
2. Cylus J., Papanicolas I, Constantinou E., Thedorou M Moving forward: 
Lessons for Cyprus as it implements its health insurance scheme Health 
Policy  April 2013Volume 110, Issue 1, Pages 1–5 
3. Health expenditure, public (% of total health 
expenditure)http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP 
4. Health at a Glance: Europe 2014, OECD  
5. 2017 European Semester: Assessment of progress on structural reforms, 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and results of 
in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. Brussels, 2017 
6. Vandoros S, Hessel P, Leone T,  Avendano M, Have health trends 
worsened in Greece as a result of the financial crisis? A quasi-
experimental approach European Journal of Public Health, Vol. 23, No. 5, 
727–731 
7. Memorandum of understanding on specific economic conditionality , 
Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 2013 
8. Petrou P Vandoros Sotiris Cyprus in crisis: Recent changes in the    
pharmaceutical market and options for further reforms without 
sacrificing access to or quality of treatment Health Policy 119 (2015) 
563–568  
9. Correia, T; Dussault, G; Pontes, C. The impact of the financial crisis on 
human resources for health policies in three southern-Europe countries, 
Health Policy, 119(12), 2015: 1600-1605 
10. Eurofound (2013) Impacts of the crisis on access to healthcare services in 
the EU, Dublin 
11. Annual report from Cyprus Statistical services. Cystat 2012, Nicosia, 
Cyprus  
12. Annual report, Nicosia General Hospital 2012 
13. Theodorou M, Charalambous C, Petrou C, Cylus J. Cyprus: Health system 
review. Health Systems in Transition. 2012; 14(6):1–128 
14. Kiliari N, Theodosopoulou E and Papanastasiou E Multimorbidity and 
unmet citizens’ needs and expectations urge for reforms in the health 
system of Cyprus: a questionnaire survey Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine Open; 5(1) 1–11 
15. Nicosia,  Annual Report of General Audit 2013, Republic of Cyprus 
16. Nicosia, Annual Report of General Audit, 2015, Republic of Cyprus 
17. Woolf S.H, Grol R, Hutchinson A,  Eccles M, Grimshaw Potential benefits, 
limitations, and harms of clinical Guidelines BMJ VOLUME 318 20 
FEBRUARY 1999 
18. Mathers CD, Loncar D (2006) Projections of global mortality and burden 
of disease from 2002 to 2030. PLoS Med 3(11): e442. doi:10. 
1371/journal.pmed.0030442 
19. Panayides N, Petrou P, Zinieri B, Giannakou A, Ahniotou G Attitudes 
Adherence and Barriers Among Puplicly Employed GPS Towards 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 
Evidence Based Medicine and Clinical Practice Guidelines in Cyprus 
PHS183  VALUE IN HEALTH 19 ( 2 0 1 6 ) A347– A766 
20. Petrou P.      Financial crisis hangover in Cyprus: tracking the  demand for 
utilization of mental health services public health 142 (2017) 4-6  
21. Petrou P   The Ariadne's thread in co-payment, primary health care usage 
and financial crisis: findings from  Cyprus public health care sector  Public 
Health 129 ( 2015 ) 1503-1509   
22. Petrou P.  FAILED ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE INAPPROPRIATE 
LABORATORY UTILIZATION IN AN EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT SETTING 
IN CYPRUS: LESSONS LEARNED The Journal of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 
50, No. 3, pp. 510–517, 2016 
23. Petrou P. An Interrupted Time-series analysis to Assess impact of 
Introduction of Co-payment on Emergency Room Visits in Cyprus . Appl 
Health Econ Health Policy. DOI 10.1007/s40258-015-0169-2 
24. Louis DZ, Yuen EJ, Braga M, Cicchetti A, Rabinowitz C, Laine C, Gonnella 
JSImpact of a DRG-based hospital financing system on quality and 
outcomes of care in Italy. Health Serv Res. 1999 Apr;34(1 Pt 2):405-15. 
25.  Schreyögg, J, Tiemann O, and Busse R (2006): Cost accounting to 
determine prices: how well do prices reflect costs in the German DRG-
system?, Health Care Management Science, 9 (3): 269-279. 
26. Shleifer, A and. Vishny R. W. (1994): Politicians and  Firms, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 109 (4): 995-1025. 
27. Berwick DM, James B, Coye MJ. Connections between quality mea-
surement and improvement. Medical Care 2003;41:I-30–8. 
28.  Tiemann O., Schreyögg, J. Effects of Ownership on Hospital Efficiency in 
Germany  Business Research Vol 2.Issue 2 December 2009, 115-145  
29.  Helmig B and Lapsley I. On the efficiency of public, welfare and private 
hospitals in Germany over time: a sectoral data envelopment analysis 
study. Health Services Management Research, 2001, 14:263-274. 
30. Herr, A (2008): Cost and technical efficiency of German hospitals: does 
ownership matter?, Health Economics, 17 (9):1057-1071. 
31. Hollingsworth, B (2003): Non-parametric and parametric applications 
measuring efficiency in health care, Health CareManagement Science, 6 
(4): 203-218 
32. Tiemann O, Schreyögg J, Busse R. Hospital ownership and efficiency: a 
review of studies with particular focus on Germany.  Health Policy. 2012 
Feb;104(2):163-71. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2011.11.010. Epub 2011 Dec 
15. 
33. Tiemann O, Schreyögg J. Changes in hospital efficiency after privatization. 
Health Care Manag Sci. 2012 Dec;15(4):310-26. 
34.  Meltzer, D., Chung, J. & Basu, A. (2002) Does Competition Under Medicare 
Prospective Payment Selectively Reduce Expenditures on High-Cost 
Patients? Rand Journal of Economics, 33, 447-468. 
35. Barro, J.R., Huckman, R.S. & Kessler, D.P. (2006) The effects of cardiac 
specialty hospitals on the cost and quality of medical care. J Health Econ, 
25, 702-21. 
36.  Chard, j., Kuczawski, m., Black, n. & Van der Meulen, j. (2011) Outcomes of 
elective surgery undertaken in independent sector treatment centres and 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 
NHS providers in England: audit of patient outcomes in surgery. BMJ, 343, 
d6404. 
37.  Mason, A., Miraldo, M., Siciliani, L., Sivey, P. & Street, A. (2008) 
Establishing a Fair Playing Field for Payment by Results. York, Centre for 
Health Economics, University of York. 
38.  LungenM,  StollenwerkB , Messne P, Lauterbach K W and Gerber A, 
Waiting times for elective treatments according to insurance status: A 
randomized empirical study in Germany International Journal for Equity 
in Health 2008, 7:1 
39.  Kuchinke BA, Sauerland D, Wubker A The influence of insurance status 
on waiting times in German acute care hospitals :an empirical analysis of 
new data Int J Equity Health 2009 Dec 21;8:44 
40. Philipa Mladovsky, Divya Srivastava, Jonathan Cylus, Marina Karanikolos, 
Tamás Evetovits, Sarah Thomson and Martin McKee  HEALTH POLICY IN 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS – Eurohealth incorporating Euro Observer — 
Vol.18 | No.1 | 2012 , 3-6. 
41. Correia, T, et al. Listening to doctors on patients' use of healthcare during 
the crisis: uncovering a different picture and drawing lessons from 
Portugal. J Public Health, 2017; 39 (2): e56-e62 
  

  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 
Table 1 
 
Policy 
Year 
2012 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016-2017 
Budgetary 
Framework- 
Fiscal Policy 
Public and 
Private sector 
 Introduction of 
temporary 
contribution to all 
employees of both 
public, broader public 
and private sector (0-
3.5%) 
 A permanent 
contribution of 3% on 
pensionable earnings 
of state employees to 
the Public Employees‘ 
Pension Plan 
 Freeze of recruitment,  
increments and 
general wage 
increase in public and 
broader public sector 
until 31 December 
2016. 
 Suspension of COLA 
for public and broader 
public sector until the 
end of the first   
quarter of 2016 
 Reduction in MOH’s 
budget -3.5%  vs last 
year 
 
 Introduction 
of 1.5 % 
annual fee to 
all 
beneficiaries 
of public 
health care 
sector   
 Scaled 
reduction in 
emoluments 
of public and 
broader 
public sector 
pensioners 
and 
employees 
 Reduction in 
MOH’s 
budget 
 -2.7% vs last 
year 
 Further  
reduction of 3% 
on all wages of 
public and 
broader public 
sector 
employees and 
pensioners 
 Reduction in 
MOH’s budget 
 -10.9%  vs last 
year 
 Reduction in 
MOH’s 
budget  
-2.6% vs last 
year 
 
Performance 
Public and 
private sector 
 Preparation for the 
introduction of DRG 
reimbursement 
system 
     Award for the 
tender of the 
IT system of 
the NHS AC
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Supply Side 
Public sector 
  Introduction 
of laboratory 
ordering 
algorithms 
Cost-
effectiveness 
analysis  
 Introduction 
of Health 
technology 
assessment 
program 
 Introduction 
of clinical 
guidelines 
   
Demand Side 
Public sector 
  Introduction 
of co-
payment in 
emergency 
room visits  
 Introduction 
of co-
payment in 
laboratory 
ordering  
 Introduction 
of co-
payment in 
pharmaceutic
als 
 Introduction 
of co-
payment for 
consultation  
 
   
Eligibility 
criteria 
Public sector 
  Revision of 
income 
thresholds for 
free public 
health care 
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able 2 
BENEFICIARY 
CATEGORIES 
BENEFITS INCOME CRITERIA Fees Other criteria for eligibility  
Category A 
 
Before 
Crisis 
15,377 euros per person 0% Personal 
Contribution 
Families with 3 and more children  
Public servants and  Officials (elected and 
appointed) students, social benefit receivers, 
children under the supervision of welfare 
services, residents in military exclusion 
zones, students at the school for the blind 
and the school for the deaf etc 
After Crisis   15,400 euros  per person 1.5% of their 
annual 
income-Free 
access at 
point of care 
Families with 3 and more children  
Public servant and  Officials (elected and 
appointed)  social benefit receivers, war 
casualties, children under the supervision of 
welfare services, residents in military 
exclusion zones,  students at the school for 
the blind and the school for the deaf  etc 
Category B Before 
Crisis 
 
Income between 15,377 
20,503  euros per person 
50% Personal 
contribution 
 
After Crisis ABOLISHED 
Chronic 
Patients  
Before 
Crisis 
 
None  0% Personal 
Contribution 
for treatment 
of specific 
condition 
only 
Diabetes, Cancer, Rheumatoid arthritis, lupus 
erythematosous, Parkinson, epilepsy, HBV, 
HCV, Bowel inflammable diseases, 
psychiatric conditions, progressing renal 
failure 
After Crisis Income criteria were set to 
150,000 euros per annum   
0% Personal 
Contribution 
for treatment 
of specific 
condition 
only 
Diabetes, Cancer, Rheumatoid arthritis, lupus 
erythematosous, Parkinson, epilepsy, HBV, 
HCV, Bowel inflammable diseases, 
psychiatric conditions, progressing renal 
failure, Psoriasis,  Attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
Chronic 
Patients with 
severe 
conditions 
Before 
Crisis 
 
None 0% Personal 
Contribution  
I. Dementia 
II. Dialysis patients 
III. Human immunodeficiency virus 
IV. Transplanted 
V. Hemophilic patients 
VI. Polycythemia vera  
VII.  Immune Thrombocytopenic  Purpura 
VIII. Congenital heart diseases 
IX. Paraplegic, quadriplegic  
X. Myasthenia gravis  
XI. Multiple sclerosis,  
XII. Growth hormone deficiency  
XIII. Cystic fibrosis 
XIV. Type 1 Diabetes melitus for minors 
XV. Autism  
XVI. Minor with body deformities 
XVII. Patients with thalassemia or 
drepanocytic anemia 
 
After Crisis For the following conditions, 
income criteria were 
introduced (150,000 euros 
per annum) 
 
I. Multiple sclerosis 
II. Myasthenia gravis 
III. Dementia  
IV. Human 
immunodeficiency 
virus  
V. Myelodysplastic s
yndromes 
VI. Drepanocytic 
anemia 
VII. Myeloproliferative 
disorder 
VIII. Congenital heart 
diseases 
0% Personal 
Contribution 
For the following conditions no income 
criteria apply  
 
I. Dialysis patients 
II. Transplanted 
XIV. Hemophilic patients, patients with 
immune Thrombocytopenic  
Purpura and other bleeding 
disorders  
III. Family Mediterranean fever  
IV. Paraplegic, quadriplegic 
V. Thalassemia patients 
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IX. Growth hormone 
deficiency 
X. Cystic fibrosis   
XI. Type 1 Diabetes 
mellitus for minors 
XII. Autism  
XIII. Individuals  with 
body  deformities   
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